Epictetus locates the whole of our freedom in one narrow gap: between
The gap between impression and assent
Epictetus finds our whole freedom in one narrow gap: the moment between an impression arriving and our assenting to it. An impression is never just a bare perception, it already comes bundled with a verdict, so 'a woman is pushing me' becomes 'I am being humiliated, a pariah.' Because the bundling happens instantly, the verdict feels like part of the world rather than something you added.
Prising the verdict from the fact
The discipline of assent means separating fact from verdict. When someone yells 'go back to your country,' those words reveal something about her, not about you. Likewise, 'she made a scene and I had to leave feeling like a pariah' should be reduced to plain fact: she made a scene, you left, calmly and correctly, with no evidence for 'pariah.'
Sorting fear from shame
Fear is a bodily fact, appropriate and not worth arguing with, but embarrassment deserves examination, since it assumes you did something shameful. Racing hearts or wanting to cry are propatheia, the mind's first motion, and they only become a full passion if you fail to reframe what actually happened.